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FROM STUDYING THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN BUDDHISM TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF LIFE Thích Hạnh Tuấn
Introduction “Impermanence, old age and sickness never make appointment with us. Whenever they arise, they will arise without any invitation. Because life is impermanent, we do not know for sure that we are still alive in the next moment. If an accident happens to us, we will disappear from the world instantly. Our lives could be resembled to a dewdrop sitting on a blade of grass in the morning of a Spring. It disappears as soon as the sun rises. Our thoughts change very fast in every moment. Time is very short. It lasts only in a single moment (kṣaṇa), like a breath. If we inhale but we don’t exhale, we die.” This is the first lesson that I learned from my master more than thirty-nine years ago on the first day after I became a novice monk. The message I learned from this lesson could tell me that I should practice Buddhism seriously. I should not let time passing by empty without doing any meaningful things. In the past thirty-nine years, I was struggling to fight for the meaning of life. I always ask myself, ‘Do I have life? How long my life is going to last? Does my life last only a short moment or does it lasts in hundred years with the continuation of the flux from this moment to another moment? ‘Life is suffering’. Definitely, there is no doubt about this. Life is suffering because every thing is impermanent. This is the very first notion of Four Noble Truths. Do all sentient beings suffer since the very first day of their lives to their last breaths? Can we get rid of this suffering right now or do we have to wait for another eon till the day we become enlightenment, like the Buddha? During this process of practicing Buddhism, do we have a meaningful life or we just struggle fighting for the meaning of our lives? Does life have a meaning only in mental state or physical body? Can we separate our mental state to our physical bodies to have a meaningful life? In Buddhism, these questions are not new to us, I believe. In the past, specially, in the dawn of Buddhism, how did Buddha explain time and how his followers understood times? What is the meaning of the life of Buddha after he became enlightenment? Can we imitate the life of the Buddha in this life? In order to find out the meaning of life, I need to go back to study the theories of time that were explained in the early Buddhist literature of Theravāda Buddhism to the highest development period of Mahāyāna Buddhism. I this essay, I am studying the concept of time in Buddhism, in order to find the meaning of life.
Time Understood in Early Buddhism[1] Since the very date of enlightenment, Śakya Muni Buddha laid down his basic doctrine, the Four Noble Truths. Not need to say, we all know that the first truth of these four is, ‘Life if suffering’. It is so because every thing is impermanence (anitya). Every thing (dharma) is conditioned and they composed of different characters. Vasubandhu describes that these conditions are four basic characters of dharma. They are: arising (jāti), old age (sthiti), duration (jarā), and impermanence (anitya).[2] These four characters give risen to all speculations of early Buddhism. Time is presented in Theravāda school by the term samaya, meaning both ‘condition’ and ‘time’. Among the many commentaries, the one referring most often to the problem of time is Buddhaghoṣa’s Atthasālinī, the commentary of Dhammasaṅgani, in which samaya is divided into the following five classifications:[3] 1. Kāla (time) represents the continuity of a situation, such as the time of coldness or of an illness, etc. This term is again classified into nine sub-divisions: (a) momentary (mental) time (citta-kara); (b) the dhamma of beings, memory of dhamma, or dhamma in the past, present and future; (c) the orderly process of things (dhammapatti), i.e., the time when seeds sprout; (d) the appearance of things (dhamma-lakkhaṇa),i.e., the time of being born or of old ages; (e) the time of reception or intimation (dhammakicca); (f) the action of human beings (sattakicca),i.e., the time of taking a both or of eating; (g) the postures of movement (iriyāpatha), i.e., walking, standing, sitting and lying; (h) the proceedings of natural phenomena (candimāsuriyādi, parivattana) i.e., the progress of the morning, evening or night and the day’s evolution; and (i) the divisions of time (kālasaṅdaya), i.e., half month, month and year. 2. Samūla (the group). A group in the sense of accumulation (punja) of dhamma such as phassa (touch, feeling), utilized to deny the notion of an individual entity, and the single cause and effect theory since Buddhism maintains everything exists by means of conditions or causes and effects. This classification was directed against the incorrect view that one existence can arise independently of others, therefore it demonstrates mutual interdependence. 3. Hetu (cause) represents the mutual interdependence of existence. For example, in order to see, the eye consciousness is required as a sufficing condition. 4. Khaṇa (momentariness) refers to the connected situation of consciousness from the past to the present and pertains only to the meritorious mind and not to the non-meritorious. As momentariness is constantly flowing from moment to moment into the past, it is difficult to attempt to catch the moment itself. The mind itself is considered to exist in the manner of momentariness. Just as momentariness is difficult to grasp, so it is difficult for the meritorious mind to arise and remain static. This classification refers to Buddhist morality or practice, because momentariness is considered only in relation to the meritorious mind. The ethical stress is to utilize the moment in the practice of good deeds. 5. Samavāya (combination refers to a concord among the conditions (paccaya-sāmaggī) and is intended to demonstrate that the consciousness have a mutual coordination in the present. In other words, it shows that time is dependent and interrelated (aññamaṇṇ’upekkhā). Time is shown to have no reality and the existence of a Creator is denied. Whenever we say all things are impermanent because they all are limited duration. This limited duration is presented in early Buddhism as a momentariness, or instant (kṣaṇa). In addition, most schools of Buddhism soon come to explain the change of things as a succession of momentary states (kṣaṇika). This origin of this notion is certainly to be looked for in the axiom accepted by some Buddhist schools and found also outside Buddhism, which holds that two psychic conditions can not co-exist in thought because the field of conscience is unique.[4] Thus most of the early Buddhist sects, the Sarvāstivādin, the Mahīśāsaka, the Kāśyapiva, the Vātsīputria, the Pūrvaśaila and the Apasaśaila, maintained that all things are momentary. As all composite things are impermanent, the Pūrvaśaila declared, they only last a single instant of thought (ekacitakkhaṇika), for being impermanent, what difference is there between a thing which is rapidly destroyed and another which lasts for a long time?[5] Before giving any thought about this question, I would present the definition of the word kṣaṇa of some schools of early Buddhism.
Time Presented in Abhidharmakośa What is the duration of kṣaṇa? This was already mentioned in the previous paragraph that it is ‘a single instant of thought (ekacitakkhaṇika)’. But how long this single of thought can be measured? We could use the smallest duration of time, the second, to measure the kṣaṇa. In his careful study of this account, Louis de la Vallée Poussin, it is presented as follow: “In Buddhism, as same as all the world, the word kṣaṇa is understood as it very short period of time if we compare it to the time of day, night or hour. Therefore, in order to have exactly duration of time of kṣaṇa, we need to compare the duration of tit to the duration of a second. According to Sarvāstivādin, 120 kṣaṇa = 1 tatkṣaṇa, 60 tatkṣaṇa = 1 lava; 30 lavas = 1 muhūrta. In all systems, 1 muhūrta is the thirtieth of a day and a night. Thus, kṣaṇa = 0,013333 second. In addition, kṣaṇa presented in Śārdūlakarṇa slightly different: 16 nimeṣas = 1 kāṣṭhā, 16 kāṣṭhās =1 kalā, 64 kalās = 1 muhūrta. In Manu, 18 nimeṣas = 1 kāṣṭhā, 30 = kāṣṭhās = 1 kalā, 30 kalās = 1 muhūrta. These measures are variant in schools of Purāṇas, Kauṭilīya, and Bhāskara. They have 100 truṭis = 1 tatparas, 30 tatparas = nimeṣa, 18 nimeṣa = 1 kāṣṭhā [6] According to the Abhidhārmikas, there are sixty-five instants (kṣaṇa) in the time that it takes a healthy man to snap his fingers.[7]
The Dimension of kṣaṇa of Sautrantikas: Vasubhandu mentions in his Abhidharmakośa: If the right conditions (pratyaya) are present, the time that it takes for a dharma to arise; or rather the time that it takes for a dharma in progress to go from one paramāṇu to another paramāṇu,[8] Vasubhandu gives another definition of kṣaṇa, ‘The kṣaṇa or moment is the time during which the characteristics have achieved their operation.’ The Sarvāstivādin based their theory on yet another consideration which concerned more closely the very doctrine of Buddhism. The same person – they contended – cannot simultaneously accomplish an act (karma) and receive the fruit to which it has given rise (vipākaphala). When an ach is a future thing, and when the agent picks that fruit the act which engendered it is a thing of the past. If therefore things past and future did not exist, past acts, being non-existent, could not engender fruits. It must be confessed that bold as this thought was, in this particular case it was very ingenious, since Buddhism rejected all personal substances which, like the ātman of the Upaniṣads or the jīva of the Jains, might have acted as a support for the mechanism of retribution for deeds committed.[9] Other school refused to accept the theory of the momentariness of all things. Among others the Theravādin called attention tot the fact that the great earth, the great ocean, the king of mountains Sumeru, water, fire, wind, the grass , the woods, the trees, last much longer that a single instant of thought.[10] Actually, this is the objectively consideration of Theravādin about the duration of time. They just considered the outside of things but not the substances of the operations of things. The Sautrāntika and the Dārṣṭāntika, whose doctrine was more elastic, got round these difficulties more adroitly. The Dārṣṭāntika affirmed, on the one hand, that the characteristic features of composites are not substances (dravya) for they are included in the disjointed composites of thought (cittaviprayuktasaṃskạra), e.g., abstractions possessing no intrinsic reality.[11] Moreover, the moment, they said, is devoid of the three characteristics of birth, decline and cessation, for, did it possess them, it would have to be born, decline and cease all at the same time, which is obviously impossible.[12] On their side, the Sautrāntika did not recognize the characteristic of duration (sthiti) – but like the Theravādin – only of modification (sthiyanythātva).[13] There was in their theories a certain amount of evolutionism, in opposition to the pure instantaneousness of the Sarvāstivādin. This trend is found again in the theory attributed to them by the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi according to which these characteristics may be attributed not only to the moment but also to a certain prolonged condition.[14] It would thus seem that they adopted on this point a compromise between the opinion of the Sarvāstivādin, for whom the characteristics are proper to the instant, and that of the Sammatīya, according to whom they are, on the contrary, proper to a prolonged condition.[15] It seems indeed that the Dārṣṭāntika, who gave to the moment its real value, i.e. the nullity of duration, were also evolutionists. They maintained , in opposition to the Sarvāstivādin, that things arise gradually and not all at once.[16] Nevertheless, the same source attributes to them a theory which it is rather difficult to interpret, but which seems to contradict the previous one, as tit claims that there is neither a precise moment of production nor a precise moment of cessation, so that, in the case of composites, there are only two times, that in which they have not yet been produced, and that in which they have already been produced; or that in which they have not yet ceased, and that in which they have already ceased.[17] The only two schools whose speculations on the nature of the moment have come down to us, the Sarvāstivādin and the Dārṣṭāntika, therefore held diametrically opposite opinions. The former, having inconsiderately made of radical momentarism one of the bases of their doctrine, had been led to introduce far too many elements into the moment, swelling, thickening and weighting this atom of time with all the potentialities, the efficiency of duration. As reaction to this the Dārṣṭāntika, laid down a priori the equation (( moment = zero )), and stuck to it stolidly, refusing to see in the moment anything but its nullity, and this drove them back to the evolutionary stand which is more orthodox and more in keeping with common sense.[18]
Time Presented as Past, Present and Future One of the Indian philosophers who presents time as past, present and future is Buddhadeva. Even though we have access to none of his works in either Sanskrit or Chinese and Tibetan translations of Buddhadeva, we can still learn his explanation of this account mentioned in Vibhāṣā.[19] The following passage quoted from Vibhāṣā will show Buddhadeva’s viess of time. “A dharma circulating in the three times is named pass, present and future in mutual dependence on the moments before and after. Just as the same woman in called ‘mother’ and ‘daughter’. Thus with reference to before and after, when there is something previous to a dharma but nothing after it, the dharma is future, when there is both a before and after, that is preset, and when there is an after but no before, that is past.” This views of time of Buddhadeva are presented slightly different in Abhidharmadīpa and Abidharmakośa. In Abihdarmadīpa, we find, ‘A dharma circulating in the three times is said to be one or the other dependent on before and after. This dharma does not undergo change of condition or of essential nature. Just as one women is called mother or daughter in dependence on before and after.’[20] In the commentary of Yaśomitra on the Abhidharmakośa, we find, ‘It is named by mutual dependence on before and after. It is called future in dependence on the fact that present and past are prior. It is called present in dependence on the fact that past is prior or future comes after. And it is called past in dependence on the fact that present or future comes after.’[21] Lastly, according to Buddhadeva, the past, the future and the present are based on reciprocal relations (anyonya) one and the same thing being past in relation to what will follow it, and future in relation to what has preceded it. As we can see, the past, the present and the future were not considered by the Sarvāstivādin as things in themselves, but as modes of being, states, features, positions, reciprocal relations.[22] Throughout the history f Indian philosophy, Buddhadeva was cited by fellow Sarvāstivādins only to be refuted in favor of the philosophically far cruder theory of Vasumitra, which obtained its status as the orthodox Sarvāstivādin theory simply because of its being favored by the Vibhāṣā, which, as has already been noted, was probably written by Vasumitra himself.[23]
Time Presented in Mādhyamika of Nāgārjuna In Mādhyamika, Nāgārjuna does not use he terms: past, present and future to examine three times. Instead, he uses three temporal relations, namely, earlier than, later than and simultaneous with. Indeed, he attempsts to show that the production of particular things is impossible because it cannot occur in any temporal moment and because a temporal relation between events cannot be established. In chapter XI of Mādhyamika, Nāgārjuna states, ‘Again, all things are empty. Why? A cause is neither earlier than, later than, nor at the same time as an effect. As it has been said, “Earlier than”, “later than” and “simultaneous with” such events are impossible. How can events be produced by causes? It cannot be true that a cause is prior to an effect. Why? If a cause exists earlier and from it an effect is produced later, there would be no effect initially, and what would be its cause? If an effect is prior to a cause, than the effect has already been established when there is no cause, and why must it need a cause? If a cause and an effect exist at the same time, there would be no causal production either. For example, the horns of a cow are produced simultaneously; the left and the right do not cause each other. The so-called cause cannot be the effect of the cause, for they are produced at the same time. Therefore the three temporal relationships between cause and effect are unattainable.[24] Obviously, causal production must be performed in certain temporal relationships: s cause is either earlier than, later than or simultaneous with an effect. But Nāgārjuna wants to show that the temporal moments of priority, posteriority and simultaneity are empty: hence the functioning of causal production cannot be established. Since causality is empty, all things are empty. For all things are causes and effects. Nāgārjuna’s intended to demonstrate that all things are empty. Because all things are lacked of their own self-natures, they depend on each other. This is the doctrine of Dependent Origination (pratīyasamutpāda) presents in Mādhyamika of Nāgārjuna.
Time Presented in Milindapañha The Milindapañha shows us a clear advance of interest in the question of time. Milinda questions Nāgasena in detail on this point, and is informed that there is past, present, and future time; time which exists and time which does not exists. In his studies of time in Milindapañha, A.B. Keith states, ‘This is explained in the sense that there are dispositions [25](saṃkhāra), which are past in the sense of having ceased to be, or having been dissolved, or altogether changed; to them time is not. But there are also conditions which are now producing effect,, or which will otherwise lead to re-individualization; to them time is. When there are beings who when dead will be reborn, there is time; when there are beings who when dead will not be reborn, there is no time; and, when beings have been altogether set free by the attainment of Nirvaṇa and bodily death; there time is essentially not.’ Further, it is made clear that there is no possibility of finding a beginning to time, or ultimate point in the past; the position is made clear by the analogy of the seed, fruit, seed; egg, hen, egg; and the circle of eye, colors, sight, contact, feeling, longing, action, and, as the outcome of action, an eye in a future birth. Finally, the sage insists as against the suggestion of the king that there may be discontinuity between the present and the past and the future that there is constant continuity. That which has not been becomes, that which has begun to become vanished away; past, that is to say, passed over to the present, and the present passed over to the future.[26] A.B. Keith believes that the ideas of the Milindapañha appear in a varied from in the Abhidharmakośa. The Sarvāstivādins are there credited with maintaining the existence of everything past, present or future, while the Vibhajyavādins distinguish in their usual mode between: (1) the present elements and those among the past which have not yet produced their fruition, which are existent and (2) future elements and those among the past which have produced their fruition, which are non-existent.[27]
Time Presented in Mahāyāna Texts Time presented in Mahāyāna texts is considered from the view of the triple times, past, present and future to kalpas of time in one world system. This view is treated special in Chinese Tripitaka (T). Lewis R. Lancaster argues that in the early Mahāyāna sūtras, the discussion of thime (adhvan) does not mention the term in the singular, only in the plural: the three times of past, future and present. ‘The problems of the triple time had occupied Buddhists long before the advent of the Mahāyāna texts and such schools as the Dārṣṭāntikas had proposed that the three times exist and are permanent while the conditioned entities which move through them are impermanent. They described their view by giving the analogy of three houses on beside the other. From the first house a man emerges and goes to the second, that is, he leaves the future and enters the present, then he moves from the second house to the third, thereby going from the present to the past. Man is the impermanent and fleeing one while the three houses of time are fixed and stand always ready to receive the constant flow of impermanent things.’[28] Obviously, time presented in Mahāyāna texts is much more different in Early Buddhism. The Mahāyāna texts merely state what has been understood and cognized by the Buddha[29], ti is not presented as a matter to be proved or disproved the concepts of tiem in Early Buddhism, but only as a statement of what is. The Buddha as an enlightened one possessed all-knowledge, the supernormal power developed through samādhi or trance and in this special state he was able to penetrate and comprehend the nature and essence of the three times.[30] When the triple times were viewed in his special way, they appeared to the Buddha as equals, the same, without distinctions or separations. The times did not oppose one another, for there was nothing in the present which was different or distinct from the future. This being the case, the sutras say, the three divisions of time, the three characteristic marks of time, are limited to the mundane world, to those who lack the insights of the all-knowers; but, on the higher level, the transcendent plane, these marks are shown to be an illusion. Therefore, the Buddha taught that the three times only possess one mark, the mark of lacking any distinguishing characteristics. [31] In Ta Chih Tu Lun (大 智 度 論), commentary of the Prajñāpāramitā compiled y Kumārajīva, states that those who do not have all-knowledge will encounter obstacles when they try to achieve a cognition of the three time.[32] It was beyond the capabilities of ordinary man. In addition, the Avataṃsaka-sūtra mentions that our universe is but one of thousands of universes or world systems. All of these worlds are not on the same scale, and so our own system is encapsulated within another real that in expanse is beyond anything we can comprehend. The sutra says, ‘If we add up all the days and nights of our world systems until they totaled a kalpa, these countless years would be equal to but one day and one night in the realm of Amitābha. And if one were to stay in Amitābha’s realm for a kalpa of that time, it would be equal to one day and one night in the next realm of Vajrasaṃhata and one kalpa there would equal to one day and one night in Dharmaketu’s realm, and so on through hundreds of millions of Buddha realms.[33] Therefore, the sutras once again bring us back to the emptiness of time, as well as to the difficulty of its comprehension, and absence of characteristic marks. The sutra further mentions that only and when the Buddha enter a state of samādhi then he sees that the three times are all equal and the same.[34] Here, time is understood as the durational whole of the reality. It is not a short period of time as kṣaṇa which was presented in Theravāda Buddhism and in Abhidharmakośa. Hence, the concept of time in Mahayana texts can be formed only when change in reality or succession of events representing past, present and future are experienced. In the absence of such change in terms of temporality, etc., there will be no concept of time. Time is in this sense a derived notion. At the level of suchness (tathatā) or ultimate reality, no such change is admitted whether in Kumārajīva’s commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā or in the Uttaratantra of Maitreya. Thus if time lacks any marks, how can we say there is time. When Lancaster says that ‘it is the whole reality, the truly universal’, he takes time as the durational whole of the reality.[35]
Kṣaṇa Relates to the Meaning of Life Throughout the studies of some main sources dealing with the concept of time in Buddhism, we would come up with some basic understanding of kṣaṇa. In early Buddhism, kṣaṇa is presented as ‘condition’ and ‘time’ or momentariness (khaṇa). This concept of time in early Buddhism reveals that life is very short. Therefore, the practitioners should always be aware of every kṣaṇa for their moral conducts. They need to devote their times to practice dhamma for the benefits of themselves and for all sentient beings. In addition, though kṣaṇa only lasts in a single instant of thought (ekacitakkhaṇitka), our moral conducts will turn to good results in the near future if we keep practicing the dhamma continuously form this single moment to another single moment. In Abhidharmakośa, a ksana equal to 0,01333 second. And, according to Abhidhārmika, sixty-five instants (kṣaṇa) take a healthy man to snap his fingers. This is the necessarily minimum duration of time for its characteristics to achieve their operations. Without this necessarily minimum duration of time, things (dharma) can never be formed. From Buddhadeva’s point of views, times are presented as pas, present and future for a dharma to circle. To Nāgārjuna, time is regarded as a dharma or a thing. Because all things, which depend on each other, are lacked of their own self-natures, they are empty. Time is also empty. Because of this, we cannot find its beginning or its termination. Moreover, in Mahayana texts, time cannot be recognized because it is beyond the capacity of our faculty of thoughts. Because of the mark of lacking any distinguishing characteristics, three time cannot be penetrated and comprehended by us but only by the Buddha who possessed all-knowledge, the supernormal power developed through samādhi. Finally, from our own experiences and the understanding through studying the concept of time in Buddhist literatures, we understand that kṣaṇa is very short duration of time; it is even shorter than a single moment of thought, but it is a necessarily duration of time for thing to operate. Obviously, our life, even short or long, are composed of every single moment. Because the only present moment is real, we do not need to worry about our past or future, but only dwelling on this present moment with mindfulness. The the future will full of wonderful promised things will be there for us.
References - Leo M. Pruden, trans., Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, California, 1988 - Sasaki, Genjun H., ‘The Time Concept in Abhidharma’ Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi, 1964. - Bareau, André, ‘The Notion of Time in Early Buddhism’, East and West 7, 1957. - Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ‘Documents d’Abhidharma: la controverse du temps’ Mélanges chinois bouddhiques 5, 1937. - Mahavibhaṣā, T.1545 - Paul Villiams, ‘Buddhadeva and Temporality’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 4, 1977. - P.S. Jaini, ed., Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāshāprabhāvṛitti, Kashi Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959 - U. Wogihara, ed., Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra, Part 2. - Hsueh-li Cheng, trans., Nāgārjuna’s Twelve Gate Treaties, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht: Holland / Boston: U.S.A. / London: England, 1982. - A. B. Keith, ‘The Doctrine of Reality (The Nature of Time)’, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Oxford University Press, 1923. - Lewis R. Lancaster, ‘Discussion of Time in Mahāyāna Texts’ Philosophy East and West 24, 1974. - H. D. Prasad, Essays on Time in Buddhism, First Edition, Mehra Offset Press, Darya Ganji, Delhi, 1991. - Taisho Buddhist Tripitaka (T), 100 volumes
[1] By using the term ‘Early Buddhism’, I am trying to avoid using another term, Hināyāna Buddhism’. Because the term, ‘Hināyāna’ became sensitive now whenever we use it, we may turn into humiliate people who are following this Buddhist tradition. [2] Leo M. Pruden, trans. Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, p.238 [3] Sasaki, Genjun H., ‘The Time Concept in Abhidharma’ Proceeding of the 26th International Congress of Orientalists, pp.471-472. [4] Bareau, André, ‘The Notion of Time in Early Buddhism’ East and West 7, p.353 [5] Ibid., p.353 [6] Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ‘Documents d’Abbhidharma: la controverse du temps’ Melanges chinois bouddhiques 5, p.140 [7] Leo M. Pruden, trans., Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, p. 474 [8] Ibid., p.474 [9] Andre Bareau, ‘The Notion of time in Early Buddhism’, East and West 7, p.358 [10] Kathavatthu, XXII. 8 [11] Mahavibhāṣa, T.1545, pp.198a-977b [12] Ibid., p.200a [13] La Vallée-Poussin, Abhidharmakośa, II, pp.223-224 [14] La Vallée-Poussin, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi p.67 [15] Ibid., p.67 [16] Mahavibhaṣā, T.1545, pp.270a-463a [17] Ibid; p.141b and 919b [18] Andre Bareau, ‘The Notion of Time in Early Buddhism’, East and West 7, p.354 [19] Paul Williams, ‘Buddhadeva and Temporality’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 4, 1977, p.279 [20] P.S. Jaini, ed., Abihdarmadīpa with Vibhāshāprabhāṛitti, p.260 (dharmo’dhavasu pravartamānasyā (-mānaḥ) pūrvāparamavekṣyānyathā coyate / naivāsya bhāvānyanthātvaṃ bhavati drāyānyathātvaṃ vā / yathaikā strī pūrvāparamapekṣya mātā coyate duhitā ca) [21] U. Wogihara, ed., Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra, Part 2, p.470. (pūrvāparam apekṣānyonya ucyata iti / pūrvām aparaṃ cāpekṣyātītā’nagatavartamānā ucyaṃta ity arthaḥ / pūrvam evātītaṃ vartamānaṃ vā’pekṣyānāgata iti / pūrvaṃ vā’tītam aparaṃ vā’nāgatam apekṣya vartamāna iti / aparam eva vartamānam anāgataṃ vā’pekṣyātīta iti / [22] Andre Bareau, ‘The Notion of Time in Early Buddhism’ East and West 7, p.356 [23] Paul M. Williams, ‘Buddhadeva and Temporality’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 4, 1977, p.291 [24] Hsueh-li Cheng, trans., Nāgārjuna’s Twelve Gate Treaties, p.101 [25] A. B. Keith, ‘The Doctrine of Reality (The Nature of Time)’, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, pp.163-164 [26] Ibid; p.164 [27] Ibid; p.165 [28] Lewis R. Lancaster, ‘Discussion of time in Mahāyāna Texts’ Philosophy East and West 24, p.209 [29] T.228, p.630c; T.234, p747c; T.1509, p.225a; and T.310, p.291b [30] T.234, p.747c; T.225, p.507c; T.279, p.648b; and T.657, p.166b. [31] Lewis R. Lancaster, Ibid., p.209 [32] T.1509, p.255a [33] T.279, p.241a [34] T.1059, p.306c; T.225, p.507a and T.279, p.684b. [35] H.D. Prasad, Essays on time in Buddhism, pp.xviii-xix
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